



Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy: 
Redefining the Biopiracy Debate 
fair and one-sided patent laws and international “agree-
me
 that illustrate what the 
glob
                                                       
If history is any indicator, biodiversity and biotechnology cannot 
coexist.1  At odds in the traditional biopiracy debate are the develop-
ing global South, home to the large majority of the earth’s flora and 
fauna,2 and the global North, owner of the capital and technology 
necessary to develop this natural wealth.3  It is the South that accuses 
the North of “biopiracy”4—a claim it advances as the result of seem-
ingly un
nts.”5
Professor Heald presents two examples
al South has aptly coined “biopiracy”:6
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1 Jim Chen, Diversity and Deadlock: Transcending Conventional Wisdom on the Rela-
tionship Between Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property, 6 CASRIP 167, 171 
(2001), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Num-
ber6/Chen.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). 
2 See Movement for a Socialist Future, How Corporations Use ‘Biopiracy’ to Patent 
Food, at http://www.socialistfuture.org.uk/globaleconomy/The%20Issues/biopi-
racyfood.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (noting that the poorer developing countries of 
the world are the source of 90 percent of the world’s biological wealth, while the world’s 
industrial nations hold 97 percent of all patents worldwide).  Flora is defined as “all the 
plant life in a particular region.”  Princeton University, Cognitive Science Laboratory, 
WordNet, at http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cqi-bin/ webwn2.o?stage =1&word=flora 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (online dictionary result).  Fauna is defined as “all the animal 
life in a particular region.”  Id. 
3 Chen, supra note 1, at 171. 
4 “The term biopiracy has been defined as ‘the patenting of plants, genes, and other bio-
logical products that are indigenous to a foreign country’ without compensating the keep-
ers of those resources and the holders of knowledge appropriated during the ethnobiologi-
cal research process.”  Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional:  The Geographical 
Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 725 (2003). 
5 See generally Chen, supra note 1.  Faced with risk of bilateral trade sanctions from 
some of the world’s most developed countries, it appears that developed countries faced a 
great deal of economic pressure to ratify the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
Treaty (TRIPS) “Agreement.” See discussion infra Part III.D.2. 
6 See Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric of Biopiracy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 519, 
520 (2003). 
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r 
the enzyme and mass produce a successful and valuable patented 
research hours.  They do not share any of 
                                                       
1.  MegaPharmCorp seeks a new treatment for diabetes and sends 
researchers to a remote rain forest where the inhabitants suffer an 
unusually low incidence of the disease.  After many interviews with 
local residents, they identify an enzyme in a variety of squash culti-
vated by them, which seems responsible for the low rate of the con-
dition.  The researchers return home, isolate the gene that codes fo
drug.  The company never compensates any of the local residents.7
2.  MegaAgriCorp is developing a smut-resistant strain of corn and 
sends researchers around the world to identify varieties of plants 
worth studying.  In the highlands of Mexico, they interview farmers 
who for hundreds of years have maintained a strain with significant 
smut-resistant characteristics.  The researchers acquire several of 
the plants and embark on a successful cross-breeding program when 
they return home. The information acquired during the interviews 
saves them thousands of 
the profits earned from sales of their new patented hybrid seed with 
the Mexican farmers.8
The motivations fueling the actions of biotechnology companies 
are two-fold.  First, bioprospecting is extremely lucrative, especially 
with respect to the pharmaceutical industry.9  Approximately one-
quarter of all prescription drugs in the United States, for example, 
contain active ingredients derived from plants.10  In 1990, revenues in 
the United States from plant-based drugs reached an estimated $15.5 
billion.11  Furthermore, in 1995, the worldwide estimated market 
value of pharmaceutical products derived from indigenous traditional 
knowledge was $43 billion.12
Agribusiness revenue potential is similarly impressive.13  While 
genetically-modified (GM) seeds were not approved for use until 
1994, by 1998 more than 45 million acres of U.S. farmland had been 
planted with such crops.14  Furthermore, revenues for the agricultural 
 
7 Id. (emphasis added). 
8 Id. at 520–21 (emphasis added). 
9 See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property 




12 Someshwar Singh, Third World Network, Traditional Knowledge Under Commer-
cial Blanket, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/blanket-cn.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). 
13 See David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and Genetically-Modified 
Foods: Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 12 (2003). 
14 Id. 
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technology industry in 2002 were estimated at more than $5 bil-
lion, and are expected to reach $20 billion by the year 2010.15
Second, the large majority of bioprospecting occurs in the global 
South because of its rich biodiversity—the higher a county’s biodi-
versity, the higher the probability of “discovering” a plant with heal-
ing qualities or a smut-resistant crop.16  Almost one-half of the 121 
plant-based prescription drugs in the entire
pics.17  Moreover, 74 percent of these drugs were discovered by 
simply researching native folklore claims.18
The substantial financial gains bioprospectors stand to reap from 
the biodiversity and traditional knowledge of developing countries 
sparks the debate as to how (and if) the financial benefits should be 
distributed to indigenous populations originally associated with the 
genetic source material.19 On one side are the biotechnology compa-
nies of the North that wish to freely “bioprospect” the diverse ecosys-
tems that characterize third world countries, hoping to develop and 
eventually sell a socially useful and highly lucrative product.20  On 
the other side are the developing countries of the South that accuse 
foreign, private companies of stealing their genetic resources and lo-
cal knowledge.21  This represents the traditional form of biopiracy, 
which occurs when the source of the traditional knowledge (i.e, an in-
digenou
nal knowledge-based product that is patented and commercial-
ized.22
 
a.  Within its borders, India also contains two of the world’s ten biogeographic zones.  
Id.
anis, supra note 9, at 273. 
ld, supra note 6, at 519–21. 
15 Id. 
16 See Ranjit Devraj, India Together, Biodiversity or Biopiracy (Dec. 2002), at 
http://www.indiatogether.org/environment/articles/biodiv02.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2005).  While India is located in the northern hemisphere and is not technically considered 
a part of the global south, a substantial amount of bioprospecting occurs there as well.  






20 See id. 
21 See Chen, supra note 1, at 171. 
22 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 




Recently, however, a new breed of biopiracy has emerged.23  Mod-
ern-day biopiracy encompasses the long-term effects that result from 
the behavior of seed biotechnology companies such as MegaAgri-
Corp.  Unlike Professor Heald’s description, however, the issue is not 
that the source of the knowledge is not being compensated.24  The is-
sue is the long-term effects associated with allowing corporations to 
genetically modify, patent, and essentially control the number of seed 
varieties used by farmers around the world.25  Granting such power 
places restrictions on traditional farming practices, which puts the 
world’s biodiversity into a continuing state of decline, thereby creat-
ing serious negative consequences for farmers and consumers.26  In-
terestingly, modern-day biopiracy also redefines the players of the 
biopiracy debate.27  Unlike its traditional c
piracy does not discriminate between the industrialized North and 
the bio-rich South.28  Instead, it pits the global consumer and the tra-
ditional farmer against the corporate world.29
This Note addresses traditional and modern-day biopiracy and con-
siders how the public policy that supports the U.S. patent system is 
undercut in both contexts.  Part I discusses the pro-patent stance of 
U.S. patent law and recounts the landmark decision Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.30  Part II analyzes how traditional biopiracy contra-
venes the goal of the U.S. patent system to promote scientific break-
throughs.  Part III considers modern-day biopiracy, specifically exam-
ining several factors that perpetuate the world’s continuing loss of 
biodiversity, the significant precedents set forth in Asgrow31and Mon-
santo32, and the efficacy of two major international agreements cen-
                                                        
23 Some have referred to the newest form of biopiracy as “biopiracy by occupation” 
whereby “patented genetic material contaminates genetic material held by peoples and 
communities, with somewhat similar results.” ETC Group, From Global Enclosure to Self 
Enclosure: Ten Years After– A Critique of the CBD and the “Bonn Guidelines” on Access 
and Benefit Sharing (ABS) Jan./Feb. 2004, at 4, available at http://www. 
etcgroup.org/documents/Comm83_COP7_CBDCBonn.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). 
24 While this is certainly important, it should be classified under the problems and po-
te
interboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
ntial solutions that are specific to traditional biopiracy. 
25 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C, III.D.3. 
26 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C, III.D.3. 
27 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C, III.D.3. 
28 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C, III.D.3. 
29 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C, III.D.3. 
30 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
31 Asgrow Seed Co. v. W
32 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C. 256. 
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tral to the biopiracy debate—the greement on Trade-Related As-
pect the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD).  Part IV sets forth suggestions for 
combating both traditional iopiracy. 
ject matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manu-
fac
e sun that is made by man.’”   Today, the 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and use-
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s of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) and 
and modern-day b
I 
THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND PATENT LAW: THE RACE TO 
PROMOTE PROGRESS 
A.  Background 
Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power “[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries[.]”33  In the late eighteenth century, Thomas Jef-
ferson used the power granted by the Constitution to codify the coun-
try’s first patent act.34  The Patent Act of 1793 broadly defined 
patentable sub
ture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement 
[thereof]”35 and reflected Jefferson’s belief that “ingenuity should re-
ceive a liberal encouragement.”36  The subsequent patent statutes of 
1836, 1870, and 1874 all remained faithful to the broad language of 
the original.37
When Congress recodified the Patent Act in 1952, it replaced the 
word “art” with “process,” an ostensibly minor change.38  However, 
the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act indicate that 
Congress intended to further broaden the statutory subject matter “to 
‘include anything under th 39
tent Act is codified under 35 U.S.C. § 101.40  This statute grants a 
patent to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
                                                     
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
34 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (1980). 
35 Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319). 
9 (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed., 
18
. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5, reprinted in 1952 
U 94, 2419). 
36 Id. at 308-0
71)). 
37 Id. at 309. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO
.S.C.C.A.N. 23
40 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2004). 
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elopment acts as a 
strong incen nvestments 
and realizing new discoveries.
n, and (3) 
49  
mpanies to use traditional knowledge without compensa-
tio
ful improvement thereof . . . subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.”41
The goal of patent law is to promote advances in technology.42  In 
essence, patents may be viewed as the inventor’s reward for her dis-
covery.43  As her reward, an inventor has the right to exclude others 
from manufacturing, using, or selling her invention for twenty years 
from the date the patent application was filed.44  This prevents an in-
ventor’s competitors from free-riding off of her success, thus allowing 
the patent-holder to reap the full benefits of her investment.45  In this 
sense, a patent may be viewed as the equivalent of a legal monopoly 
to which an expiration date is attached.46  While monopolies of any 
kind are generally considered adverse to technological advancement, 
it is the incentive system that patent protection creates that drives new 
breakthroughs.47  For example, the ability to regain, and substantially 
profit from, investments made in research and dev
tive for inventors to continue making such i
48  Thus, patent law attempts to strike a 
balance between the societal need to benefit from new discoveries and 
the inventor’s need to profit from her investment. 
B.  The Foundation that Supports Biopiracy 
The U.S. Patent Act requires the filer of a patent to fulfill three re-
quirements: (1) novelty, (2) non-obviousness of the inventio
utility.   As will be discussed, this three-prong foundation allows
Western co
n, and simultaneously acts to block indigenous populations from 
patenting and protecting their own traditional knowledge.50
                                                        
41 Id. 
42 See id.;  James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent 
Pr ENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 271 (2003). 
ra note 42, at 271. 
 supra note 42, at 271. 
tent Policy, 21 B.C. 
TH e 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103. 
B.1–3. 
otection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. G
43 See Gathii, supra note 42, at 271. 
44 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2); see Gathii, supra note 42, at 271. 
45 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154; Gathii, supra note 42, at 271. 
46 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154; Gathii, sup
47 See Gathii,
48 See id. 
49 David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections 
for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agri-
culture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 89 (1995); Leanne M. Fecteau, Note, The Aya-
huasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions about Current U.S. Pa
IRD WORLD L.J. 69, 73–77 (2001); se
50 See discussion infra Part I.
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1.  Novelty 
Two separate sections of the Patent Act codify the “novelty” re-
quirement.51  Section 101, for instance, states that the invention or 
discovery must be “new.”52  Similarly, section 102 requires that the 
invention or discovery be “novel.”53  While it may appear that the in-
ventor must meet both of these requirements, the case law suggests 
that section 102 is all-encompassing.54  Therefore, an inventor that 
satisfies the “novelty” requirement under section 102 also meets the 
“new” requirement under section 101.55
Section 102(a) of the Patent Act speaks to the “novelty” require-
ment—a filer may obtain a patent unless “the invention was known or 
used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 
by the applicant for patent . . . .”56  However, contrary to other patent 
systems, U.S. patent law does not require “absolute novelty” for ob-
taining a patent, which effectively waters down the novelty require-
ment.57  Instead, it allows the patenting of inventions known or used 
in foreign countries, as long as the invention has not been patented or 
                                                        
51 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102. 
and is to be construed in accordance with the provisions of § 
10 te omitted). 
ment, the Supreme Court in Gayler v. Wilder offered 
ntor . . . although the improvement had in fact been invented before, 
51 
Drafting 
Cl NG L. INST. 379, 396 (2003). 
52 Id. § 101. 
53 Id. § 102. 
54 In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that “[t]he word 
‘new’ in § 101 is defined 
2.”) (footno
55 See id. 
56 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).  While Congress did not state a clear reason 
for the “printed publication” require
the following justification in dicta: 
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already given to the world and 
open to the people of this country . . . upon . . . reasonable inquiry.  They would therefore 
derive no advantage from the invention here . . . and the inventor therefore is not consid-
ered to be entitled to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is not patented, nor described 
in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote places for ages, and the 
people of this country be unable to profit by it. The means of obtaining [the] knowledge 
would not be within their reach . . . . [I]t would be the same thing as if the  improvement 
had never been discovered. It is the inventor here that brings it to them, and places it in  
their possession. And as he does this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards him 
as the first . . . inve
and used by others. 
U.S. 477, 497 (1850); see also Bagley, supra note 4, at 698–99. 
57 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property, Genetic Re-
sources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally, 11 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 565 n.85 (2003); Rochelle K. Seide et al., 
aims for Biotechnology Inventions, 368 PRACTISI
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disclosed in a printed publication (in either the United States or a for-
eign country).58  The aim of this provision is to encourage the impor-
tation of technology to the United States.59  However, the absence of 
an “absolute novelty” requirement works to the detriment of indige-
nous populations in underdevelo
nal knowledge is passed on by word of mouth and unlikely to be 
published.60  As a result, the apparent one-sidedness of this require-
ment has fostered debate among critics who question whether the U.S. 
patent system is actually protecting the rights of valid patent holders, 
or whether it is merely granting privileges to profit from another 
country’s traditional knowledge.61
The Enola bean patent controversy illustrates this criticism.62  In 
1994, La
RS, planted yellow beans he had purchased in Sonora, Mexico and 
allowed them to self-pollinate until a crop of distinctly yellow beans 
was produced.63  In 1999, Proctor received a patent for his bean vari-
ety and subsequently sued a company importing Mexican yellow 
beans into the United States, claiming that the beans infringed on his 
patent.64
The Enola bean was found to fulfill the novelty requirement65 even 
though indigenous populations had cultivated yellow bea
                                                        
58 McManis, supra note 57, at 565 n.85. 
59 Id. 
60 See Fecteau, supra note 59, at 74. 
61 See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 9–
10 (1997). 
62 See U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (issued Apr. 13, 1999). 
63 See Bagley, supra note 4, at 701. 
64 See id. at 701-02.  According to Miguel Tachna Felix of the Agricultural Association 
of Rio Fuerte, 
We had been exporting this yellow bean (Mayocaba) and others to the United States for 
over four years when POD-NERS received their patent —based on erroneous claims.  





When they got the patent they sent a letter to all the importers of Mexican beans in the 
United States, warning that this bean was their property and that if they planned to sell it 
they would have to pay
port sales, over 90%, which affected us tremendously. And it wasn't only one bean 
y, but also others, because it created fear among bean importers[.] 
Enola Bean Patent Challenged (RURAL ADVANCEMENT FOUND. INT’L, Canada), Jan. 5, 
2001, at 1-2, available at http://www.etcgroup.org/ documents
sited Feb. 24, 2005). 
65 See generally U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (issued Apr. 13, 1999). 
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frado and mayocoba for centuries,66 an
ed companies had been exporting for many years prior the very type 
of bean variety for which Proctor had been granted a patent.67  In ad-
dition, the “publication” requirement mandated under section 102(a) 
may make it impossible to challenge the Enola bean patent unless 
printed information on the Enola bean can be produced.68
2.  Non-obviousness or Inventiveness 
Under section 103 of the Patent Act, the filer’s invention o
very must also be non-obvious in order to be patentable.69  This re-
quirement has been criticized as being the “most unfair” to indigenous 
populations.70  Similar to the novelty requirement, the prior art71 used 
to ascertain if an invention is obvious does not include prior knowl-
edge or use outside the United States.72  Therefore, a member of an 
indigenous population from a foreign country is excluded from the 
category of a “person with ordinary skill in the particular art.”73
The way in which the non-obvious requirement discriminates 
against indigenous populations of third world countries can be seen 
with the patenting of the endod berry.74  Ethiopians have used this 
plant as a laundry soap and fish intoxicant for centuries.75  In addi-
tion, other tropical indigenous groups have utilized the endod berry 
                                                        
66 See Gillian N. Rattray, The Enola Bean Patent Controversy: Biopiracy, Novelty and 
Fish-and-Chips, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 11 (2002).  Azufrado and mayocoba are 
considered the ancestors of the newly-patented Enola bean.  Id. 
67 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
la bean.  If Mexico’s claim is accurate 
an  printed publication, the Enola bean patent could be invalidated 
un
ual Property Office, Patents Glossary, at 
ht last visited Feb. 24, 
20
s, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
91  the Parasite, at 
ht
3; Mukerjee, supra note 74. 
68 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (2004).  Mexico believes that a bean registered in Sinaloa, 
Mexico in 1978 is genetically identical to the Eno
d if it is contained in a
der section 102(a).  Rattray, supra note 66, at 6. 
69 35 U.S.C.A. § 103. 
70 Lester I. Yano, Protection of the Ethnobiological Knowledge of Indigenous People, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460 (1993). 
71 “Prior art” is defined as “[t]he body of existing patents or patent applications or any 




72 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103; Fecteau, supra note 49, at 75. 
73 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 103; Fecteau, supra note 49, at 75. 
74 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific 
and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communitie
9, 923 (1996); Madhusree Mukerjee, The Berry and
tp://chora.virtualave.net/lema2.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
75 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 74, at 92
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inal purposes to treat schistosomiasis, a potentially fatal 
pa
The third and final requirement is described in section 101 of the 
Pate tu-
tion.   Und romote the 
pr
that confirms a discovery rather than the innovator who actually 
                                                       
 
for medic
rasitic disease carried by aquatic snails.76
The fact that the non-obviousness requirement can be fulfilled in 
the above example, even though the endod berry had been used by the 
indigenous peoples of Ethiopia for hundreds of years, highlights the 
inherent inequity of the non-obvious requirement.77  This requirement 
is highly technical; because the native population did not know the 
exact active substance that produced the endod berry’s beneficial ef-
fects, obviousness was not a bar to patentability.78
3. Utility 
nt Act, which is based on Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Consti
79 er this authority, Congress has the power to p
ogress of science.80  In exercising section 8 authority, Congress re-
quires that an invention be useful.81  The utility requirement is con-
sidered the easiest out of the three requirements to fulfill.82  It has a 
low threshold; the patent applicant must only show that her invention 
or discovery has some “conceivable use.”83  In general, an invention 
would have to qualify as illegal or immoral to be denied patentability 
on non-utility grounds.84
C.  The Public Policy Revisited: Traditional Biopiracy and a 
Restriction on the Free Flow of Information 
While the purpose of the U.S. patent system is to promote scientific 
breakthroughs, critics argue that its broad approach to patent protec-
tion does just the opposite.85  Specifically, with respect to traditional 
biopiracy, granting patents to companies like MegaPharm and 
MegaAgriCorp undercuts patent protection by rewarding the party 
 
74. 
8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
5 U.S.C. § 101. 
76 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 74, at 923; Mukerjee, supra note 
77 See Yano, supra note 70, at 460. 
78 See id. at 460–61. 
79 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
80 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 3
81 See 35 U.S.C. §101. 
82 Fecteau, supra note 49, at 76. 
83 See Yano, supra note 70, at 457. 
84 Fecteau, supra note 49, at 76–77. 
85 See SHIVA, supra note 61, at 9. 
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 points out, the phar-
ma
vator is overlooked and, as a result, the incentive to share knowledge 
that will benefit society 89
e, the Organization 
                
 
makes the discovery.86  This failure to reward can be considered the 
traditional form of biopiracy. 
As Nicholas Hildyard of the British Ecologist
ceutical MegaCorps of the world are building upon the traditional 
knowledge of native populations without rewarding the source of that 
knowledge in any way.87  In other words, in the context of biopiracy, 
the U.S. patent system merely rewards the party who confirms a prior 
discovery, manipulates its properties for the purposes of manufactur-
ing and large-scale distribution, and markets the “new” product to 
consumers.88  In essence, the crucial first step in rewarding the inno-
 is lost.
The U.S. patent system, and the disincentive to share knowledge 
that it creates, has restricted the free flow of information for at least 
the past twenty-five years.90  In 1979, for instanc
of African Unity sought to combat biopiracy by urging herbal medi-
cine research to be conducted in a confidential manner.91  This atti-
tude, albeit justified, encourages Southern researchers and indigenous 
populations92 to remain tight-lipped about traditional cures.93  This 
                                        
Battle for “Blessed Tree”, 
IN SERVICE GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, Oct. 12, 1993, available at 1993 WL 
25
, at 921–23.  Examples include quinine, which has 
n to treat fevers; the endod berry, which has 
RACTISING  
at in order for the public policy to be effectu-
. at 93-94.  Read, for example, excerpts from interview with Brazilian Indians 
he tribe considers Chicki Uba a prized natural resource, 
e 1980’s.  Twenty-seven-year-old Puta 
86 See discussion infra Parts III.A-C., III.D.3. 
87 See generally John Tanner, India: U.S. Giant, Peasants 
TER PRESS 
34808. 
88 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 74
been used by the Andean indigenous populatio
been used by inhabitants of Ethiopia as a fish intoxicant; and the neem seed, which has 
been used by the farmers of India as a natural insecticide. See id. 
89 This contrasts with the view of some experts, who believe that merely rewarding the 
person who discloses an innovation is sufficient to support the public policy that supports 
patent law.  See Gail R. Peterson, Overview of Intellectual Property, 762 P L.
INST. 11, 30 (2003).  I contend, however, th
ated, the patent applicant must do more than “disclose” an innovation, the applicant must 
actually make the discovery. 
90 See Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional 
Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 74, 93 (1997). 
91 Id. 
92 See id
on protecting traditional knowledge: 
QUA TUTU(ph): (Foreign language spoken) 
KASTE: ‘Chicki Uba(ph) is something that we put on arrowheads to kill animals,’ says a 
teenager named Qua Tutu . . . .  T
one which they believe was stolen from them in th
We(ph) recalls how soon after first contact a German researcher arrived in the village, ask-
ing to see interesting plants. 
Mr. PUTA WE: (Foreign language spoken) 
 
Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy 369 
 
silence lessens the chance that information from the global South will 
be shared and analyzed in collaborative efforts with Northern re-
searchers with the financial means to make traditional cures available 
to the global market, thereby decreasing the odds that populations 
around the world will benefit from traditional cures.94
Re-establishing the crucial first step and requiring biotechnology 
companies to compensate indigenous populations would create the 
quid pro quo exchange necessary to facilitate information sharing 
and, thus, effectuate the policy that supports patent protection law.95
II 
THE SPARK OF TRADITIONAL BIOPIRACY: SETTING THE STAGE 
FOR ITS MODERN-DAY COUNTERPART 
While the inherently pro-patent stance of the U.S. patent system 
certainly plays an important role in perpetuating both traditional and 
modern-day biopiracy, it was not until the Supreme Court addressed 
the patentability of life that the practice of biopiracy truly began to 
emerge.96  In essence, the explosion of this phenomenon may be 
                                                                                                                       
KASTE: ‘He came to get Chicki Uba for himself,’ Puta We says. ‘We’d go get it for him 
and he’d give us prizes, a machete or a cooking pot.’  Pro-Indian activist groups say the 
Chicki Uba samples ended up in the hands of a German company which used it as the ba-




ut to share the details of his discoveries, despite 
th icated to the spirit of scientific openness. 
Na
 markets have a large financial stake in 
su  indicated that retail sales for the Ameri-
ca  $2.3 billion in Asia, $6 billion in the 
Eu
ccompanying notes 92-93. 
 tropical plants, and that alone is enough to sour the Indians’ attitude toward curious 
siders. 
Mr. PUTA WE: (Foreign language spoken) 
KASTE: ‘A lot of people show up in the village wanting to know what we use for medi-
cines,’ Puta We  says, ‘but we not [sic] longer show them our medicines the way we 
showed them to that researcher.’ 
Mr. JUAN REVILLA: (foreign language spoken) 
KASTE: ‘And here’s the product,’ he says, plunking down a flask of dark, oily liquid. 
‘This cures   sinusitis.  I have 50 more products just like this, substances that only I know 
how to make.’ Revilla says he’s not abo
e fact that he works for a research institute ded
tional Public Radio: Weekend Edition, (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 31, 2002), available 
at 2002 WL 7824258 (emphasis added). 
93 See Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 90, at 93. 
94 See id. “[T]he World Health Organization estimates that 80% of the world's popula-
tion still relies on traditional medicine and that 85% of traditional medicine is based on 
plants.”  McManis, supra note 57, at 578 (citation omitted).  In addition, it appears that 
American, Asian, Chinese, European, and Japanese
ch a backlash.  For example, estimates in 1994
n herbal medicine industry totaled $1.6 billion,
ropean Union, and $2.1 billion in Japan. See id. 
95 See supra text a
96 See Nicholson, supra note 13, at 12. 
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products of nature” as patentable subject matter.
ndian microbiologist Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, an 
em
[Chakrabarty’s] 
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own[.]”105
In opening up an entirely new subject matter as patentable, the 
Ch ty 
law
traced back to the landmark Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chak-
rabarty.97  In Chakrabarty, the Court explicitly recognized the statu-
tory right to patent life, overturning the long-held precedent that ex-
cluded “ 98
In 1971, I
ployee of General Electric (GE), genetically engineered a form of 
bacteria that could break down crude oil, this bacteria could be used 
in the clean-up of oil spills.99  Soon thereafter, GE applied for a patent 
on Chakrabarty’s genetically engineered oil-eating bacteria.100  The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected GE’s patent appli-
cation, basing its decision on the traditional legal rule that “products 
of nature” (i.e., life forms) are not patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. 
§ 101.101
The case was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.102  In 
June 1980, by a five-to-four majority, the Court ruled that a patent 
should be granted to GE.103  In so holding, the Court implicitly reaf-
firmed its prior precedent which stated that “products of nature” could 
not be patented, and distinguished Chakrabarty’s genetically-
engineered bacteria on the basis that he had “produced a new bacte-
rium with markedly different characteristics from any found in na-
ture....”104 The Court elaborated, stating that “[h]is 
akrabarty decision had a profound effect on intellectual proper
.106  In essence, the Chakrabarty decision created a slippery slope 
and paved the road for the expansion of patentability under section 
101.107  In Ex parte Hibberd, for example, the Board of Patent Ap-
peals and Interferences relied on Chakrabarty and ruled that geneti-
                                                        
97 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (recognizing the right to patent life-forms). 
98 See id. at 310. 
99 See id. at 305; SHIVA, supra note 61, at 9. 
100 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. 
101 Id. at 306. 
102 Id. at 305. 
103 Id. at 318. 
104 Id. at 310. 
105 Id. 
106 Erin Kathleen Bender, Comment, North and South: The WTO, TRIPS, and the 
Scourge of Biopiracy, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 281, 290 (2003). 
107 See Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 447 (Bd. Patent App. and Interferences, 1985). 
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A NEW BREED OF BIOPI  OF NORTH AND SOUTH 
 Policy Revisited A Third Time: A Loss in 
genetic codes have similar reactions to variables within their envi-
ronment—including, among others, drought, insects, and disease.112  
W  weaknesses create a potential for 
di
cally altered plants could receive patents.108  And thus, traditional 
biopiracy mutated into its modern-day counterpart. 
III 
RACY: UNITY
The failure to promote biological diversity, and the enactment of 
laws that perpetuate the loss of biological diversity, can be considered 
the newest form of biopiracy.  Modern-day biopiracy is unique to the 
now biotechnology-driven agribusiness industry.  While it may bene-
fit the industry in the short-term, modern-day biopiracy will work to 
the detriment of agribusiness in the long run.  More importantly, 
modern-day biopiracy will have disastrous effects on inhabitants and 
consumers of the world, both now and, most notably, in the future.109
 A. The Public
Biodiversity 
For hundreds of years, individual farmers have contributed im-
mensely to the world’s biodiversity by replanting seeds from hand-
selected plants that displayed distinctive characteristics.110  In fact, 
subsistence farmers often try to increase crop diversity to better cope 
with the environment’s “variability.”111  Plant varieties with similar 
here reactions are similar, shared
saster.  A major drought, for example, could destroy an entire re-
gion’s crop harvest.113
                                                        
108 Id. at 444. 
109 See discussion infra Part III.A, C, D.3. 
110 John Tuxill, Appreciating the Benefits of Plant Biodiversity, at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/biodiv/benefits.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).  For 
example, farmers may choose to replant the seeds from a plant variety that matures more 
quickly, is more resistant to pests, or that exhibits a unique color or taste.  Id. 
111 See id. The desire to increase crop diversity and limit damage from environmental 
variability has led to the development of “thousands of folk varieties, or ‘landraces.’”  Id. 
112 Peter J. Gross, Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropri-
ability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1403 (1996). 
113 See id.; Yvonne Cripps, Patenting Resources: Biotechnology and the Concept of 
Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 122 (2001).  “The Irish 
potato famine of the nineteenth century and the 1970 corn leaf blight in the United States 
provide examples of past catastrophes that were exacerbated by genetic uniformity.”  
Gross, supra note 112, at 1403. 




While on-farm crop selection still remains the practice of choice in 
developing countries,114 the seed cultivation process in industrialized 
nations has evolved into a corporate venture, in which companies 
have assumed the responsibility for supplying seeds.115  The commer-
cialization of seed cultivation has caused what the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization ironically calls an “impressively 
uniform” genetic base.116  In the Netherlands, for instance, the three 
most popular varieties of nine major crops surveyed blanketed 81
 percent of planted crop acreage.117  In 1949, China grew approxi-
mately ten thousand wheat varieties; by the 1970s, that number had 
dwindled to only about one thousand.118  One single wheat variety 
made up 67 percent of Bangladesh’s wheat acreage in 1983 and 30 
percent of India’s in 1984.119  Likewise, in Mexico, only 20 percent of 
the corn varieties cultivated there in the 1930s can still be found.120
The reason for such losses in crop diversity can be attributed to the 
inherent inability of a relatively small number of commercial players 
to replicate what millions of farmers have done for thousands of 
years.121  In comparison to 1904, for instance, the commercial agricul-
ture companies and major seed storage facilities of today carry less 
than 20 percent of the crop varieties for tomatoes and less than 10 
                                                        
114 Tuxill, supra note 110.  Farmers in developing countries continue to save and re-
plant 80% to 90% of their own seed supplies.  Id.  In the entire world, approximately 672 
million acres of land are currently being cultivated—25% of which consisted of geneti-
cally-modified (GM) crops in 2003.  Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Fact 
Sheet, at http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/display.php3?FactsheetID=2 (last 
vi
. 
here is nothing impressive about the world’s dwindling ge-
ne
r-
marked for Extinction? Seminis Eliminates 2000 Varieties 1, RURAL ADVANCEMENT 
FO INT’L, (Canada), July 17, 2000, at 1, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/geno_earmarked.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). 
ill, supra note 110. 
sited Mar. 16, 2005).  Beginning in 1996, the United States has led the world in GM crop 
production, planting 105.7 million acres of GM food in 2003.  Id. 
115 See Tuxill, supra note 110
116 See id.  Unfortunately, t
tic plant diversity: “Monoculture greatly enhances risks from pests and disease.” See 
Cripps, supra note 113, at 122. 
117 Tuxill, supra note 110. 
118 See id.  The Mexican subsidiary Seminis has a virtual monopoly in the seed industry 
and built its “empire” by acquiring approximately a dozen seed companies.  By 2000, 
Seminis controlled almost one-fifth of the worldwide fruit and vegetable seed market and 
provided approximately 40% of all vegetable seeds sold in the United States.  Seminis 
proclaimed in June of 2000 that it would “eliminate” 2,000 varieties of seeds, which con-




121 See id. 
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scientists to respond rapidly to the 
drawbacks that result from genetic uniformity,123 it is important to 
no s 
in technology, but a rticular genetic re-
so
in plant sciences, plant varieties must be statutorily protected.   Leg-
islation to grant patents for plant-related inventions, for example, was 
proposed as far back as 1892129 and was supported by prominent in-
dividuals such as Thomas Edison130 and Luther Burbank.131  In 1930, 
C
                               
percent of the crop varieties for peas and cabbages.122  While some 
contend that biotechnology allows 
te that the ability to respond is made possible not only by advance
lso by the availability of a pa
urce.124  In the 1970s, for example, when a virus began attacking 
GM Asian rice varieties, breeders combated the virus by isolating an 
immune wild rice species in Uttar Pradesh, India.125  Therefore, while 
the ability to transfer genes made combating the virus efficient, it was 
the presence of a specific genetic resource that made combating the 
virus possible to begin with.126  Interestingly, this specific population 
of rice has not been found since.127
B.  The Continuing Loss in Biodiversity: Interpretations of the 
Plant Variety Protection Act 
It is well settled that in order to promote progress and development 
128
ongress passed the Plant Patent Act (PPA), which grants patent pro-
tection for asexually-reproduced plants.132  As the technology neces-
                         
original plant to form a new plant.  See Cindy Rea, Asexual Re-
122 Id. 
123 See Gross, supra note 112, at 1403. 
124 See generally Tuxill, supra note 110. 
125 Id. 
126 See id. 
127 Id. 
128 See Elisa Rives, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants 
and Their Progeny Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 
187, 197 (2001-2002); Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
129 Imazio, 69 F.3d at 1562. 
130 Id.  Thomas Edison strongly supported plant-related patent protection, stating that 
“[n]othing that Congress could do to help farming would be of greater value and perma-
nence than to give to the plant breeder the same status as the mechanical and chemical in-
ventors now have through the law.” Id. 
131 Id.; Luther Burbank was a leading plant breeder who was quoted by his widow as 
saying “that until Government made some such provision [for plant patent protection] the 
incentive to create work with plants was slight and independent research and breeding 
would be discouraged to the great detriment of horticulture.” Id. at 1562–63. 
132 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2000).  Asexual reproduction in plants involves detaching 
and growing parts of an  
374 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19(2), 2004] 
 sexually-reproduced plants.   The protections conferred un-
de
y, the PVPA appeared to strike a fair balance between the 
desi  to 
min 138  
The or 
farm
on to save 
 
sary to identify plant characteristics emerged, researchers lobbied for 
new laws that would protect sexually-produced plants they “discov-
ered.”133 Consequently, in 1970, Congress broadened plant-patent 
protection and passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), which 
protects 134
r the PPA and the PVPA are similar.135  Both award the right-
holder the ability to exclude others from producing or using the pro-
tected plant or seed.136  Both also grant a twenty-year term of protec-
tion.137
Initiall
re to promote progress among plant researchers and the need
imize the resulting restrictions that would be placed on farmers.
 “Farmers’ Exemption,” for instance, carved out certain rights f
ers: 
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder, for a pers
seed produced by him from seed produced by him from seed 
obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of 
the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such 
saved seed in the production of a crop for use on the farm of 
the person, or for sale as provided in this section.139
Under this exemption, farmers have the right to save protected 
seeds to plant the next season or to sell to other farmers for the same 
                                                                                                                       
production Cloning, at http://www.maximumyield.com/viewart.php?article=111 (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 005).  Plants produced through asexual reproduction are considered clones  2
of the original plant.  See id.  Sexual reproduction, on the other hand, involves the ex-
change of genetic material between parents to produce a new plant, which shares traits 
from both parents.  
es could not be reproduced reliably by seed.”  Susan E. Gustad, Legal Own-
er tions for Farmers, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 
45 995). 
Gustad, supra note 132, at 464. 
2582. In order to receive a certificate and thus protection un-
de ited States Department of Agriculture and 
show that the pla t is: (1) new and distinct, (2) novel, and (3) uniform and stable.  Id. §§ 
24
olson, supra note 13, at 18 n.77. 
See Master Gardener, Ohio State University Extension School, Plant 
Propagation, at http://www.hcs.ohio-state.edu/mg/manual/prop.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2005).  Sexual reproduction in plants usually occurs through the use of seeds.  See id.  Pro-
tection was initially restricted to asexually reproduced plants based on the notion that 
“plant varieti
ship of Plant Genetic Resources – Fewer Op
9, 464 (1
133 See 
134 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–










See 7 U.S.C. § 2543. 
139 Id. § 2543. 




re family farmers from northwestern 
Io
e Winterboers argued that the language of the 
Fa
purpose.140  The exemption does not apply to farmers who sell pro-
tected seeds for reproductive purposes as their prim
prise.141  In addition, the sale of saved seed under this exemption 
must be to another farmer whose primary farming purpose is to grow 
crops for consumption or feed.142  Thus, the exemption would not ap-
ply if the seeds were sold to farmers who grew crops for reproductive 
purposes.143  Despite these and other limitations,144 the Farmers’ Ex-
emption initially provided farmers with sufficient leeway to save 
seeds from their crops and to sell to other farmers.145
In Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, however, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Farmers’ Exemption and imposed significant limitations 
on a farmer’s right to save and sell seeds.146  The plaintiff, Asgrow 
Seed, developed agricultural seed and sold it to farmers.147  The de-
fendants, the Winterboers, we
wa who had purchased the plaintiff’s product.148  Asgrow alleged 
that the Winterboers were selling seeds to other farmers using a proc-
ess called “brown-bagging.”149  This, Asgrow argued, infringed on its 
certification awarded under the PVPA.150  The Winterboer’s chal-
lenged Asgrow’s claim on the basis that brown-bagging did not con-
stitute infringement since it was exempt under the Farmers’ Exemp-
tion delineated in the PVPA.151
Specifically, th
rmers’ Exemption confers the right to sell an unlimited amount of 
seed produced from a protected variety as long as both the buyer and 
seller are farmers “whose primary farming occupation is the growing 
                                                        
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 Section 2541 lists eight acts that would infringe on a certificate owner’s right, which 
“i brids, and dispensing the seeds without notice 
th  note 132, at 466 n.86; see 7 U.S.C. § 2541(1)–
(8
 supra note 132, at 466. 
 In a brown-bag sale, a farmer purchases seed from a developer, 
plants the seed in her own fields, harvests the reproduced seed, cleans it, and sells it in 
no n bags to other farmers to plant on their own farms.  Id. at 182. 
nclude selling, importing, producing hy
at are a protected variety.”  Gustad, supra
) (2000). 
145 See Gustad,
146 See generally 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
147 Id. at 181–82. 
148 Id. at 182. 
149 Id. at 181–83. 
n-descript brow
150 Id. at 181–83. 
151 Id. at 183–85. 
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of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes.”152  Asgrow, on 
the other hand, contended
ve and resell the amount of seed that would be necessary to replant 
her own fields.153
In its interpretation of the exemption, the court of appeals sided 
with the defendants and found nothing that would limit the amount of 
protected seed sold to the seller’s own acreage.154  In effect, this rul-
ing would have allowed a farmer to sell up to half of his crop produc-
tion from PVPA-protected seed to another farmer for use as seed, as 
long as he sold the remaining half from that specific variety for non-
reproductive purposes.155
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.  In writing the opinion, 
Justice Scalia applied a narrow interpretation to the word “m
”156 in section 2541(a)(3) of the PVPA, which prohibits sexual 
multiplication “as a step in marketing.”157  Under this interpretation, 
the behavior of the Winterboers easily met the low threshold set by 
the new definition of “marketing.”158  As a result, the Court found 
that the Winterboers did not fall within the Farmers’ Exemption and 
had violated section 2541(a)(3) of the PVPA.  Thus, under the As-
grow holding, a farmer may only sell PVPA-protected seeds for re-
productive purposes if the seeds were originally purchased with the 
intention to be harvested (i.e., nonreproductive purposes).159   
Under Asgrow, the right to sell seed under the Farmer’s Exemption 
is reduced to the notoriously murky issue of intent.  While establish-
g intent may prove difficult for agribusiness, defending such a suit 
will prove especially costly for independent farmers like the Winter-
                                                        
152 Id. at 184. 
153 Id. at 185.  The amount of seed that the Winterboers saved and resold “greatly ex-
ceeded” the amount that would be needed to replant their fields. 
154 Id. at 184. 
reproductive p155 Id. at 185.  A sale for non
r feed. 
urposes would include one that is sold for 
foo
eals interpreted the word “marketing” to include “extensive or co-
or ies, such as advertising, using an intervening sales representative, 
or
d o
The court of a156 pp
dinated selling activit
 similar extended merchandising or retail activities.”  Under this interpretation, the Win-
terboers were found “exempt” from any infringement under the Farmers’ Exemption of the 
PVPA since their behavior did not conform with this definition.  Asgrow Seed Co. v. Win-
terboer, 982 F.2d 486, 492 (1992).  The Supreme Court, however, held that marketing 
does not require that the promotional or merchandising activities connected with the sell-
ing be extensive.  Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 187-88. 
157 Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186. 
158 Id. at 187-88. 
159 513 U.S. at 189. 
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ers to bear the enormous 
costs associated with discovery and trial. To avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety a ing to defend even a 
gr
 prove detrimental to farmers and consumers in both 
the
owest prices is low.   In addition, the 
Co
 
boers. Establishing intent can be a very complex and nuanced factual 
issue, making such suits inappropriate for summary judgment 160— 
thus forcing defendants like the Winterbo
nd to limit the costs of hav
oundless suit, independent farmers like the Winterboers may simply 
opt to replant leftover seed the following season even if they origi-
nally intended to harvest it that same year. 
C.  Asgrow’s Implication 
Asgrow will
 short- and long-term.161  Interestingly, while the case benefits ag-
ribusiness conglomerates in the short-term, it will have negative ef-
fects in the long-term.162  Generally, two main consequences will re-
sult from the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Farmers’ 
Exemption.163
First, in the short-term, seed companies will elevate their profits 
from the increased prices that they can charge.164  In the United 
States, for instance, the majority of plant patents are concentrated 
among a relatively small number of seed companies.165  As a result, 
competition to offer the l 166
urt’s narrow interpretation of the Farmers’ Exemption will increase 
demand by forcing more farmers to buy seeds directly from seed 
companies more often.167  These two dynamics will increase the prof-
                                                        
160 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) (“Treating issues of 
intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace.”); Croley v. Matson Naviga-
tion Co., 434 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that “[t]he court should be cautious in 
granting a motion for summary judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue requires 
a determination of state of mind.”); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 575 
N  “[i]n cases where motive, intent, or other 
sta udgment is often inappropriate.”); Pederson 
v. ass. 1989) (stating that “the generally accepted 
ru ind . . . 
co  cause of action is disfavored.”) (quoting Quincy 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 469 N.E.2d 797, 800 (Mass. 1984)). 
ustad, supra note 132, at 471–72. 
supra Introduction. 
ussion supra Introduction; see also Gustad, supra note 132, at 471. 
tad, supra note 132, at 471. 
.E.2d 1107, 1110 (Mass. 1991) (stating that
f mind questions are at issue, summary jte o
 Time, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (M
le is that the ‘granting of summary judgment in a case where a party’s state of m
nstitutes an essential element of the
161 See G











(where the bulk of the world’s seed varieties are found), the same 
s  
well.  As a consequence, t d resources will decrease, 
wh
its of seed companies, while forcing farmers (directly) and consumers 
(indirectly) to pay more.168
Second, increased seed prices may ultimately result in a smaller se-
lection of crops available for farmers to grow.169  The Court’s narrow 
interpretation of the Farmers’ Exemption, for instance, will limit the 
ability of farmers to sell seeds from the previous season’s crop.170  As 
a result, they will replant the leftover seeds to harvest as the following 
year’s crop.171  This will result in repetitive farming of the same crops 
on the same land, which will lead to soil exhaustion.172  Thus, a chain 
reaction will begin.173  Lower soil quality will cause a reduction in 
seed variety, which will cause a decreased level of biodiversity, which
ll cause a decreased range of food sources, which will negatively 
affect both the consumer as well as the farmer.174  Initially, lower soil 
quality will cause a reduction in seed variety to farmers like the Win-
terboers in the United States.  However, as American biotechnology 
companies expand into third world, biorich countries such as India175
ituation will occur, causing a decrease in the world’s biodiversity as
he range of foo
ich will negatively affect both the consumer as well as the farmer. 
Therefore, in the short-term, seed companies will generally experi-
ence a rise in profitability at the expense of both farmers and consum-
ers.176  However, in the long run, all three classes (consumers, farm-
                                                        
168 See id. 
169 Id. 
170 See generally Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
171 Gustad, supra note 132, at 471. 
n, even if it involves rotating different varieties of the same crop, 
pr  becoming fallow.”). 
ublic Radio broadcast, Talk of the Nation, Dec. 27, 2000), available at 
ngineer-
 has not approved it for commercial use yet, but has started allowing testing, and gov-
er
Id
o Gustad, supra note 132, at 471. 
172 Id. (“Crop rotatio
events the soil from
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 472. 
175 Should Genetically Modified Crops Be Harvested in Third World Countries (Na-
tional P
http://www.foodfirst.org/media/interviews/2000/totn12-27.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2005). 
And India, the Indian government, has taken a relatively positive view of genetic e
ing,
nment officials talk about it in fairly positive terms as far as the potential it has. 
. 
176 See discussion supra Introduction; see als
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ers, and seed companies) will be negatively affected due to the conse-
quences associated with a continuous decline in biodiversity 177
D.  United States Geo-centris
and the PVPA 
As the United States expanded patentability to include plants and 
other life forms, two nearly antithetical international concerns were 
welling: the need to protect the world’s biodiversity and the need to 
protect intellectual property rights.178  Not surprisingly, beginning in 
the early 1990s, two international agreements took center stage in the 
debate over how to protect the biodiversity of developing nations 
while promoting the interests of patent-holders.179  The TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD 
 technology-driven industrialized countries of the North and the 
biodiversity-abundant developing countries of the South.180
1. The Third World Challenge 
In 1992, the CBD was negotiated at the Rio De Janeiro Earth 
Summit as a means to address the depletion of the world’s biodiver-
sity.181  It became effective on December 29, 1993 and 175 countries 
are currently parties to the CBD.182  Article 8(j) specifically obligates 
member countries to “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge . . . 
of indigenous and local communities . . . for the conservation and sus-
tainable use of biological diversity . . . and [to] encourage the equ
 sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowl-
edge . . . .”183
                                                        
177 See discussion supra Introduction; see also Gustad, supra note 132, at 471. 
pra note 57, at 548–49. 
Note, You Say Yes, I Say No: Defining Com-
m
760 U.N.T.S. 76, 31 I.L.M. 818, 
82 /legal/cbd-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) 
(e
178 See McManis, su
179 See id. at 549. 
180 See id. at 548. 
181 Muria Kruger, Note, Harmonizing TRIPS and the CBD: A Proposal from India, 10 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 169, 188 (2001). 
182 See id.; As will be discussed, the United States has signed, but not ratified, the CBD. 
For a list of parties to the CBD and their ratification status, see Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, available at http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2005); see also Laurel A. Firestone, 
unity Prior Informed Consent under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 16 GEO. 
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 171, 175 n.20 (2003). 
183 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1
6, available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc
ntered into force on Dec. 23, 1993) [hereinafter CBD]. 
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ble use, and sharing of benefits.
ch 
inc
slim, difficult to resist given the growing need to provide their citi-
zens with basic necessities.191
   
While the CBD attempts to provide some redress to countries af-
fected by biopiracy, it has been deemed virtually ineffective in pro-
tecting the rights of biodiversity-rich countries.184  In analyzing the 
CBD, it is helpful to begin with article 1, which enumerates the fol-
lowing goals: (1) the conservation of biological diversity, (2) the sus-
tainable use of the components of biological diversity, and (3) the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic re-
sources, including appropriate access to genetic resources—taking 
into account all rights over those resources, transfer of relevant tech-
nologies, and funding. 185  Generally, article 1 tries to strike a balance 
between conservation, sustaina 186
Article 3 of the CBD also serves an ambitious purpose, granting 
states “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental policies,” subject to “the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment . . . beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.”187  Therefore, according to article 3, a nation could theoretically 
deny all foreigners access to its genetic resources.188  Realistically, 
however, two important considerations prevent developing countries 
from exercising their article-3 rights.189  First, developing countries 
are poorly equipped to handle the intricacies of bioprospecting, whi
lude the product’s development, patenting, and large-scale manu-
facturing.190  Second, the governments of developing countries find 
the compensation offered from northern bioprospectors, however 
                                                     
184 See Firestone, supra note 182, at 183. 
185 CBD, supra note 183, at 823; McManis, supra note 57, at 556. 
186 See CBD, supra note 183, at 823. 
187 See id. at 824. 
s best offer: “The infrastructure is simply 
no anent epileptic state . . . roads are largely in a state 
of disrepair . . . [h]igh rate of unemployment has created serious doubts as to the necessity 
an al education.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
188 See id. 
189 See Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of 
Plants’ Genetic Resouces, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 585, 596–97 (2003). 
190 See id. Professor Nwabeuze notes that the third world research facilities that would 
normally develop and patent a product “are either extinct or in a sorry state of dilapida-
tion.”  Id. 
191 See id. at 597.  Professor Nwabeuze also implies that a developing country’s lack of 
infrastructure lends it to accept a bioprospector’
t there.  Power supply . . . is in a perm
d utility of form
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would read certain provisions of the CBD in a manner that protected 
in 202
 
Articles 15 and 16 are the most controversial provisions of the 
CBD; the articles attempt to regulate the flow of genetic resources 
and biotechnology 192
icle 3’s purpose of guaranteeing developing nations sovereignty 
over their natural resources, article 15 gives national governments 
“the authority to determine access to genetic resources” and makes 
such access subject “to national legislation.”193  In addition, this Arti-
cle provides that access to genetic resources may occur only on “mu-
tually agreed terms.”194  Equally controversial, article 16 requires de-
veloped countries to transfer technology to developing countries.195
Interestingly, the United States initially refused to sign the CBD, 
stating that it posed a conflict to intellectual property rights.196  Rec-
ognizing the biotechnology industry’s massive revenues and signifi-
cant potential for future growth,197 then President George H.W. Bush 
refused to sign the CBD because it would limit American intellectual 
property rights.198
However, at the urging of U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
firms, the Clinton administration signed the CBD on June 4, 1993.199  
The endorsement of the CBD gave these pharmaceutical and biotech-
nology firms the opportunity to interpret the precise meaning of cer-
tain clauses in future treaty negotiations.200  To this end, while lobby-
ing for the United States to endorse the CBD, these comp
ned a business-environmental coalition, which encouraged Presi-
dent Clinton to simultaneously issue an “interpretive statement.”201  
The purpose of the statement was to establish that the United States 
tellectual property rights.   The decision to sign the CBD based on 
                                                        
192 See CBD, supra note 183, at 828-29; Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gar-
de s in Deep-Sea Vent Conservation and Managemens of Eden:  International Law Issue
. I ’L ENVTL L. REV. 563, 604
nt, 
13 G  (2001). 
8-29. 
EO  NT
CBD,193  supra note 183, at 82
Id. 194
195 Id. at 829. 
McManis, supra196  note 9, at 256. 
197 “The biotechnology industry has mushroomed since 1992, with revenues increasing 
from $8 billion in 1992 to $34.8 billion in 2001.”  Minnesota Biotechnology, What is Bio-
technology?, at http://www.mnbio. org/whatisbiotech/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
198 McManis, supra note 9, at 256. 
199 Id. 
200 See id. at 256-57. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 257. 
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ll, while the CBD initially appeared promising to developing 
to biotechnology 
 the United States, which dominates 
bio
   
 
this contingency was met with a flurry of protests from developing 
member countries of the CBD, who viewed the statement as an at-
tempt to derail the effort to protect the world’s biodiversity.203  As a 
result, the United States agreed to omit the text when it signed the 
treaty in June 1993, and planned to formulate an alternative version of 
the text when ratifying the treaty in September 1993.204  However, 
Congress has yet to ratify the treaty.205  Thus, with respect to the 
United States, the CBD is very much a “dead” document.206
Overa
countries, it has done little to increase their access 
for two major reasons.207  First,
technology research and development, signed the CBD on June 4, 
1993, but has yet to ratify it.208 Second, the CBD’s provisions are 
ambiguous.209  For example, signatories are required to take legisla-
tive, administrative, or policy measures “as appropriate” and must 
share the results of research and development “in a fair and equitable 
way.”210  These vague phrases make enforcement of the CBD diffi-
cult, and thus severely undermine its efficacy.  Overall, the CBD has 
provided the developing South with little recourse in controlling bio-
piracy. 
                                                     
men203 See Pratap Chatterjee, Environ
 I P S G  I
t: Biodiversity Pact Change “Threatens Ecol-
ogy”
INT’L 
s with the Contracting Party providing 
su rticles 8(j) and 10(c) have been criticized on 
th , CIP ESEAP, Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Kn
, NTER RESS ERVICE LOBAL NFORMATION NETWORK, July 16, 1993, available 
at 1993 WL 2538431.   Third World Network in India activist, Dr. Vandana Shiva, raised 
awareness concerning the interpretative text’s implications among groups around the 
world, spawning large numbers of protest letters and faxes to the U.S. government. 
204 See id. 
205 McManis, supra note 9, at 257. 
206 See id. 
207 See id.; Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. 
L.J. 47, 71 (2001). 
208 See McManis, supra note 9, at 257. 
209 Murphy, supra note 207, at 71. 
210 CBD, supra note 183, at 828-29.  “Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, 
administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, . . . with the aim of sharing in a fair and 
equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
commercial and other utilization of genetic resource
ch resources . . . .” (emphasis added).  Id.  A
e same basis. See MICHAEL HALEWOOD
owledge and International Law, available at 
http://www.eseap.cipotato.org/upward/Publications/Agrobiodiversity/pages%20501-
513%20(Paper%2060).pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
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2.  The Industrialized Conquest 
In 1993, the TRIPS Agreement, which sets forth minimum interna-
tional standards designed to protect intellectual property, officially 
entered the biopiracy debate.211  One year later, the TRIPS Agreement 
was ratified during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which created the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO).212  Under the TRIPS Agreement, an international and 
highly protective intellectual property system was established.213  In 
many ways, the TRIPS Agreement is considered the antithesis of the 
CBD—it was met with strong resistance from developing countries 
for many years.214  However, faced with threats of bilateral trade 
sanctions from the United States Trade Representative,215 resistance 
among developing nations quickly dissipated.216  In this respect, 
“[t]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of 
economic ostracism, what could not be accomplished through nego-
tiations independent of the international economic framework.”217
Predictably, the TRIPS Agreement has been criticized as serving 
the interests of industrialized nations at the expense of developing 
countries.218  Such criticism is not unfounded as American lobby 
groups played a significant role in ensuring the passage of the TRIPS 
Agreement.219  For example, the International Intellectual Property 
Alliance (IIPA)220 and the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC),221 
 
reement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, 
g the Obvious: Patents and Biological Material, 
20  (2003). 
Development, 18 LAW & POL’Y 315, 334 
(1
supra note 211, at 60. 
211 See Marrakech Ag
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights In-
cluding Trade, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 [hereinafter TRIPS]; Nabila Ansari, International Patent 
Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 57, 60-61 (2002). 
212 See Diana D. McCall, Note, Statin
03 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 247
213 See generally TRIPS, supra note 211. 
214 See McCall, supra note 212, at 240. 
215 See id.; The United States, Japan, and the European Community were the principal 
supporters of TRIPS due to a then-estimated $60 billion per year they were losing from 
patent violations in developing nations. In addition, intellectual property has become the 
United States’ largest export. See id. at 246-47. 
216 See id. at 240–41. 
217 See id. (quoting Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: 
Human Rights to Intellectual Property and 
996)). 
218 See Ansari, 
219 See id. 
220 Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and 
Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 193, 194 
(2002).  The IIPA is best described as an “umbrella lobbying group” that promotes the in- 
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the TRIPS Agreement is especially troublesome to devel-
op
organizations that lobby for intellectual property policy that benefits 
the biotechnology industry and other companies with patent-intensive 
products, “were major players in the push for TRIPS.”222
Because of the one-sided private interest groups involved, the 
TRIPS Agreement exacerbates the effects of biopiracy, causing native 
populations to further lose control over their resources.223  Article 
27.3(b) of 
ing countries because it essentially transforms the Chakrabarty de-
cision into an international ruling, forcing other WTO member-
countries to fall in line with the United States in accepting the pat-
entability of life.224  For example, the TRIPS Agreement effectively 
overrules the Indian Patent Act of 1970 by requiring the protection of 
plant genetic resources.225  As a result, India must protect its plant ge-
netic resources “either by patents or by an effective sui generis sys-
tem or by any combination thereof.”226  Developing countries have 
criticized the sui generis227 alternative as being just as elaborate as a 
patent system.228  Consequently, this alternative provides no real 
                                                                                                                       
terests of eight trade associations and more than 1,500 companies, which sell products and 
services that are copyright-intensive. See id. 
221
sui 
ge b) are required to: 
1) provide for an intellectual property right; 2) provide the same advantages to non-
na ; 3) provide the same advantages to all WTO-member trading part-
ne ) cover plant varieties of all species; 5) permit actions against infringement;  
Id.  The number of IPC members has ranged between eleven and fourteen.  When 
the Uruguay Round of GATT began in 1986, its members included Bristol-Myers, CBS, 
DuPont, General Electric, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Johnson & Johnson, 
Merck, Monsanto, and Pfizer. Id. at 194 n.2. 
222 Ansari, supra note 211, at 60. 
223 See id. 
224 See Shalini Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity of Rights of Developing 
Nations: A Perspective from India, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587, 611 (2002); Meetali 
Jain, Note, Global Trade and the New Millenium: Defining the Scope of Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection of Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in India, 22 HAST-
INGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 777, 781 (1999). 
225 Jain, supra note 224, at 781.  Although the Indian Patent Act of 1970 does not ex-
plicitly prohibit the patenting of genetic resources, its language allows for this interpreta-
tion and “excludes from patentability any method of agriculture or horticulture and inven-
tions that are frivolous or claim anything obviously contrary to well-established natural 
laws.”  Id. at 781 n.16. 
226 See TRIPS, supra note 211, at 94. 
227 Sui generis is defined as “[of] its own kind or class[.]” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1448 (7th ed. 1999). Countries that utilize such intellectual property rights protection sys-
tems (IPRPS) theoretically may specify subject areas and certain rights to which their 
IPRPSs will apply. See Jain, supra note 224, at 779 n.8. 
mber-countries that promulgate their own 228 For example, at a minimum, me
neris system to comply with article 27.3(
tionals as nationals
rs (MFN); 4
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tual property rights by es-
tabl A 
mem -
stance, sparks various dispute resolution processes, resulting in a 
pan 232  
Und a-
tion to mem 233
most of these poor countries 
are dependent on bilateral trade relations with one or more 
developed countries.236
                                                                                                                      
choice as to how member-countries may comply with article 
27.3(b).229
Developing countries also take issue with the enforcement mecha-
nism set forth under the TRIPS Agreement.230  When the WTO offi-
cially replaced GATT, it further strengthened the underlying policy of 
the TRIPS Agreement—protecting intellec
ishing new, relatively stringent enforcement mechanisms.231  
ber state that violates a TRIPS Agreement provision, for in
el decision regarding the corrective action that should be taken.
er GATT, the panel’s decision served merely as a recommend
ber states as to what punishment, if any, should result.  
However, under the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body makes all 
panel decisions binding unless the members agree to override the de-
cision.234  Therefore, because the TRIPS Agreement mandates a 
higher level of intellectual property protection, and because there is 
now a presumption that all panel decisions are binding, developing 
member countries are faced with greater pressure to avoid violating 
the TRIPS Agreement and the harsh trade sanctions that can fol-
low.235  In the words of one commentator: 
Even though the majority of the 135 members of the WTO 
are poor countries, they are being virtually held hostage.  
Third World countries . . . [are] compelled to go along with 
the developed countries because 
 
6) be more than a registration of a trademark/name; 7) be more than a geographical de-
nomination; and 8) provide more than protection against unfair competition. 
Jain, supra note 224, at 781 n.18.  While the rules of article 27.3(b) were to be reviewed 
by the TRIPS Council beginning in 1999, no changes have been made thus far.  Frederick 
M. b  TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS 
Ag  BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 169 (2000); see TRIPS, supra note 211, at 94. 
TRIPS, supra note 211, at 94. 





230 See Jain, supra note 224, at 781-82. 
231 See id. at 782. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Nadia Natasha See
 Developing Countries: An Examination of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, 3 
SCHOLAR 339, 360 (2001). 
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Although it has been argued that developing c
portunity to benefit from the strongly protected intellectual prop-
erty rights mandated by the TRIPS Agreement, this argument fails in 
two respects.237  First, acquiring a patent is beyond the financial
me 238ans of many indigenous populations.   Second, even if indige-
nous populations were able to use their traditional knowledge as a ba-
sis to patent a product, enforcement of such patents would most likely 
prove “prohibitively expensive.”239  Factors such as “lack of eco-
nomic self-sufficiency,” “unequal bargaining power” between the 
third world and the corporate world, and “the high cost of litigation” 
effectively preclude any benefits such countries could potentially re-
ceive from the TRIPS Agreement.240
3.  Compliance with Article 27.3(b): Monsanto 
Recent developments clearly indicate that the inhabitants of even 
some of the most strongly developed countries will be negatively af-
fected as their home countries enforce the TRIPS Agreement.241
In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, Monsanto, the world’s 
largest seller of GM crops in the world, sued Canadian farmer Percy 
Schmeiser for allegedly infringing on its patent.242  The suit was 
based on Monsanto’s discovery of its GM RoundUp Ready canola—
 
237 See Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE 
W.
so taken action outside of the courtroom.  In what may be described as an 
in s to at least twenty-three seed distributors 
in  
 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
C. 256, & 1; see also Corporate Watch, Monsanto, at 
ht
 RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 255 (2001). 
238 See id. at 255-56.  “Even though patent fees in some jurisdictions may be reduced 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, the cost of acquiring a patent is still likely to be 
prohibitive.”  Id. at 256. 
239 See id. at 255.  For example, the cost to prepare and prosecute a patent application in 
the United States is estimated at $20,000.  Id. 
240 Id. 
241 See generally Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C. 256, available at 
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).  Among 
others, Monsanto has also filed suit against the North Dakota Nelson Farm in the United 
States, alleging that the Nelsons infringed on its patent by saving RoundUp Ready soybean 
seed from their 1998 and 1999 crop.  While the North Dakota State Seed Arbitration 
Board  ruled against the company’s claim, Monsanto nevertheless continues to pursue its 
case and has filed suit in federal court.  Thompson Coburn LLP, the law firm representing 
Monsanto, has al
timidation tactic, Thompson Coburn sent letter
 North Dakota, instructing them to “avoid selling Monsanto’s products to the Nelsons.” 
See generally Robert Schubert, Monsanto Still Suing Nelsons, Other Growers, available at 
http://www.nelsonfarm.net/issue.htm
242 Monsanto, [2001] F.
tp://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/profiles/biotech/monsanto/ monsanto1.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2005). 
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ut a license.   Despite Schmeiser’s con-
ten
seed biotechnology industry.   In addition, 71 percent of the GM 
cr
Canola designed to withstand the use of certain pesticides—growing 
on Schmeiser’s land witho 243
tion that the seed growth on his farm occurred through no act of 
his own, the lower court ruled that the way in which the seeds ended 
up on the defendant’s land was “really not significant” to the resolu-
tion of the case, and ordered that all of the profits made from crops 
produced by the patented seed belonged to Monsanto.244  Based on 
the reasoning set forth in this holding, Schmeiser was ordered to pay 
approximately $140,000 in damages and legal costs.245  The appellate 
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, but did so on different 
grounds, focusing instead on the knowledge of the farmer.246  In its 
decision, the court reasoned that a farmer would be liable for patent 
infringement if he saved seed from plants that he “knew or should 
have known . . . were glyphosate resistant” and then cultivated and 
sold the resulting plants.247
In 1999, Monsanto dominated 80 percent of the market share of the 
248
ops planted the year before were engineered to be resistant to 
                                                        
243 See Monsanto, [2001] F.C. 256, & 15, 37. 
244 See id. at & 11, 119.  “[T]he source of the RoundUp resistant canola in the defen-
dants' 1997 crop is really not significant for the resolution of the issue of infringement 
which relates to the 1998 crop.”  Id. 
245 See id. at & 128–140. 
246 Hilary Preston, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liabil-
ity Theories, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1157 n.40 (2003); see Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada 
Inc., [2002] F.C. 309, paras. 58-60. 
247 Preston, supra note 246, at 1157 n.40; see Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc., 
[2002] F.C. 309, ¶ 58-60.  The Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear the appeal, which 
was argued on January 20, 2004.  A.B. Hansen, Percy Schmeiser’s Supreme Court GMO 
te, available at http://www.commonground.ca/iss/0402151/schmeiser.shtml (last vis-
nto’s biotechnology traits increased a whopping 
—from 23.5 million hectares in 1998 to 34.8 million hectares in 1999.2 Wood 
M sts based in London, estimates that Monsanto held 
an rket share for agbiotech in 1999. 
Id
upda
ited Feb. 24, 2005). 
248 Speed Bump or Blow-Out for GM Seeds?  Stalling Markets, Taco Debacle & Bio-
tech Bail Outs, (Dec. 21, 2000) 2 RURAL ADVANCEMENT FOUND. INT’L, (Canada), avail-
able at http://www.etcgroup.org/ documents/geno_speedbump.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2005). 
The market for GM seeds is overwhelmingly dominated by Monsanto (now owned by 
Pharmacia).  In 1999, Monsanto’s GM seeds were planted on 34.8 million hectares (86 
million acres) worldwide—approximately 87% of the total area devoted to GM crops in 
1999. Global area devoted to Monsa
48%
ackenzie, agrochemical industry analy
 80% ma
. 
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and, stories such as Schmeiser’s will inevitably 
be
rocess, and instead simply saves seed in accordance with 
normal farming tradition, he risks being sued for patent infringement 
and losing substantial revenues.257  In order to avoid the lengthy and 
financially-unsound process of crop distinction, and to limit potential 
liability, most farmers will simply opt to purchase GM patented seeds 
                                                       
Roundup or a similar herbicide.249  As companies such as Monsanto 
seek to continually exp
come more common.  Thus, the rulings of the trial and appellate 
courts place the conventional farming community in a “Catch-22.” 250  
Once a farmer has reason to know that his crop has been contami-
nated—which poses a very real threat—he has the duty to save seed 
from crops that found their way onto his land.251  The farmer, how-
ever, has no efficient means to distinguish his conventionally-grown 
(CG) crops from those that are GM and patented.252  As a result, the 
farmer will be forced to employ the same means implemented by 
Monsanto inspectors—spraying the crops with RoundUp.253  This act 
will most likely kill all of the farmer’s CG crops, leaving behind the 
GM patented crops.254
Since the farmer does not have a license agreement to grow the 
GM patented crops, and since the large majority of his CG crops are 
most likely dead due to the spraying, the farmer will not have the abil-
ity to make a profit on his crops.255  Finally, since he is prohibited 
from saving GM patented seed, he will be forced to purchase all new 
seed for the subsequent year’s planting.256  If the farmer does not fol-
low this p
 
nic Consumers Association, New Study Links Monsanto’s RoundUp to Cancer, 
at 
ht lyphocancer.cfm (last visited Feb. 24, 
20
71 ineered crops planted in 1998 [in the United States] are designed to 





% of genetically eng
 resistant to herbicides such as glyphosat
eveloping herbicide resistant crops as d re also increasing their production capacity for 
the herbicides such as glyphosate . . . . 
Id. 
250 Preston, supra note 246, at 1159. 
251 Id. 
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 Id. 
255 See id. at 1159-60. 
256 Id. at 1159. 
257 Id. 
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from the beginning.258  As a result, plant biodiversity will continue to 
 
supply, and the price of GM patented seed will rise due to a spike in 
de
rations will be inclined to use the favorable rul-
ings in Asgrow and Monsanto to file  patent infringement suits and 
increase thei  to the bio-
technology industry to help stop biopiracy.  In fact, because biopiracy 
thing in its power to ensure that biopiracy continues to exist.  Instead, 
we
 
decline, the price of CG and organic crops will increase due to lack of
mand.259  In the short-term, because of price increases, farmers and 
consumers everywhere will be the most affected.260  In the long-run, 
due to diminishing biodiversity, no one (not even Monsanto) will 
benefit.261
IV 
ERADICATING BIOPIRACY—TRADITIONAL CURES AND MODERN-
DAY REMEDIES 
The legal duty of corporations to maximize the wealth of their 
shareholders is in direct conflict with the notion that corporations will 
compensate indigenous populations when not legally required to do 
so.  Similarly, corpo
r bottom line.  Therefore, we should not look
is lucrative, the biotechnology industry has done, and will do, every-
 must turn to the institutions that allow biopiracy to remain legal 
(and highly lucrative) in the first place: the government and  the un-
knowing consumer. 
                                                        
258 See id. at 1160. 
259 See discussion supra Parts III.A, C. 
260 Once contamination does occur, it appears that such affects will be particularly 
damaging to the inhabitants of the developing world where “[a]griculture is the primary 
source of employment and livelihood for [three] out of [four] people . . . .”  See Rattray, 
supra note 66, at 12. 
See discussion supra Part III.A, C.  There are also implications that people’s health may be 
in 
nario described above, because farmers now have a large incentive (i.e, avoid being sued) 
to use GM crops, this will increase the amount of chemicals used on farms.  See id. at 471-
72 largest contributor to non-point water pollution be-
ca
danger.  See Gustad, supra note 132, at 471.  For example, if given a choice, a farmer 
would most likely opt to develop conventional crops that are naturally resistant to the 
weeds and insects, instead of relying on chemicals.  Id. at 472.  However, under the sce-
.  Ironically, “[a]griculture is the 
use of the extensive use of fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides.”  Id. at 459 n.7. 
261 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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cide known as Margosan-O.266  In 1988, Larson sold his patent to 
W   Soon thereafter, W.R. Grace began processing twenty 
tons of neem seed per day.268  As a result, neem seed prices in India 
    
A.  The Medicine for Traditional Biopiracy 
1.  The United States: Ensuring Non-Waivable Rights for Third World 
Countries 
As the leader of the industrial world, the United States should 
amend the TRIPS Agreement to require companies that obtain patents 
based on traditional knowledge to enter into a mandatory contract 
guaranteeing specific, non-waivable rights to the developing nations 
from which the resource originated.  This contract should delineate 
two essential, non-waivable rights.  
The first right, if appropriate, should be a “re-forestation” plan that 
calls for restocking of the natural resource from which a patent is de-
rived at a rate similar to its extraction.  When unitary corporations 
patent a natural resource, the traditional population’s knowledge 
transfers to the hands of one patent holder, and thus becomes mo-
nopolized.262  This monopolization artificially drives up the price of 
the specific plant in question, preventing those who were first to real-
ize and use the resource from continuing its use. 
The patenting of neem seed extract serves as a good example.263  
The neem tree is an indigenous plant of India and its oil has been used 
medicinally for hundreds of years to cure a number of ailments.264  In 
addition, the residue left behind after the oil has been extracted from 
neem seeds is used as a highly effective insecticide.265  In 1971, 
aware of the many uses of the neem tree, United States national 
Robert Larson used neem seed extract to produce and patent a pesti-
.R. Grace.267
                                                    
262 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
263 See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, AntiCommons Property, and Biopiracy in the 
(Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 51–52 (1998). 
264 Id. at 51. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. The market worth of the neem seed product totaled $400 million in 1993.  Tan-
ner, supra note 87. 
268 Aoki, supra note 263, at 51.  Under U.S. patent law, the process that W.R. Grace 
employs to extract the chemical from the neem seed and the process used to produce a sta-
ble em e both meet the novelty requirement.  See Shubha 
Ghosh e Traditional Knowledge Debate, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BU ).  While the complexity of Grace’s method contrasts with that of In- 
ulsion with a stable shelf-lif
, The Traditional Terms of th
S. 589, 619 (2003
Traditional and Modern-Day Biopiracy 391 








skyrocketed from 300 rupees per ton to an average of 3500 rupees per 
ton.269  In effect, patenting and large-scale production of the neem 
seed has made this resource too expensive for the average local 
farmer in India to purchase.270  This has forced the population to 
change the crops they farm and abandon the tra
ve relied upon for countless generations.271  A “re-forestation” plan 
will keep inflation of a particular natural resource in check, which 
will benefit not only the indigenous population, but biotechnology 
companies as well. 
Second, the contract should include a provision that entitles devel-
oping countries to compensation.  The compensation, however, 
should not be in the form of a lump sum compensatory scheme.  Such 
a payment scheme would not be effective in eliminating the draw-
backs of biopiracy.  If companies are allowed to compensate native 
countries in lump sum fashion, such compensation would function as 
a zero-interest loan because of the inflation that results when a patent 
is approved (as illustrated by the case of the neem seed).  Due to such 
inflation, natives who continue to rely on the natural resource in ques-
tion for daily living will most likely end up paying the bulk of t
p sum “award” back over time as they continue to make pur-
chases.  Instead, the contract should include a proviso that grants the 
country a right to receive royalties from all sales. 
This cooperative approach between international intellectual prop-
erty rights and the environmental protection of developing countries 
has already emerged in isolated incidents.272  An example includes the 
1991 contract between Costa Rica’s Institutio Nacional de Biodiver-
sidad (INBio) (a private, non-profit organization with close ties to
Costa Rican government) and Merck & Company, Ltd. (Merck) (a 
pharmaceutical company based in the United States).273  In this co
ct, INBio agreed to provide Merck with 10,000 sample chemical 
                                                                                                                       
dian farmers —w ho simply smash the seeds, soak them in water overnight, skim the emul-
sion off the top, and throw it on their crops—the final product is essentially the same.  
Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree: A Case History of Biopiracy, at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). In the end, Larson 
an  
pra note 263, at 51. 
id. 
efense of Geographic Disparity, 88 MINN. L. REV. 222, 233–
34
d W.R. Grace made millions, and the inhabitants of India were compensated nothing. 
Id. 
269 Aoki, su
270 See id. at 52. 
271 See 
272 Craig Allen Nard, In D
 (2003). 
273 See id. 
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challenged a U.S. patent for the use of turmeric as a healing agent.279  
Th case where a developing country suc-
ce . patent of its traditional knowledge.280  
However, “in order to prevail, attorneys had to scour translated texts” 
and find written evidence that the powder form of turmeric “had been 
us
uch easier and would also increase the 
 
extracts from wild plants, insects, and microorganisms from Costa 
Rica’s conserved wildlands for Merck’s drug-screening program.274  
In return, it is believed that Merck paid INBio $1.35 million for these 
samples and for information on their traditional use.275  Merck also 
agreed to pay royalties “on future sales of products developed from 
the samples, which are invested, in part, in conservation efforts.”276
Mandating such non-waivable rights is vital since developing 
countries may attempt to outbid one another in the hopes of securing 
much needed capital, creating a “race to the bottom” scenario.277  In 
order to further guard against this contingency, the CBD should be 
given the authority to approve or deny all contracts
developing countries.  Such a procedure would essentially
all developing nations, giving them more leverage in neg
ct terms and preventing a “race to the bottom” from occurring. 
2.  The Global South: Using the Novelty Requirement to Its Benefit 
Developing countries can take an active role in resisting biopiracy 
by instituting a systematic publication of traditional knowledge.  By 
implementing such a publication, developing countries will be able to 
use section 102(a) of the Patent Act to their advantage.278  In fact, in 
August 1998, India’s Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
is became the first known 
ssfully challenged a U.S
ed for healing for several generations in India.”281  A publication, 
whereby such information is accumulated well beforehand, would 
make the litigation process m
success rate of future challenges in patent cases.282
                                                        
274 See id. at 234. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. (citation omitted). 
277 See Frank René López, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy After 
September 11: Profits, Freedom, and Human Rights, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 740 (2004); 
Murphy, supra note 207, at 73. 
278 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
279 Jain, supra note 224, at 816. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 See id. 
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populations to share their knowledge, a greater number of poten-
tially patentab ilable, which 
    
a.  United States Assistance: The Use of Its Peace Corps 
In fact, should the United States choose to help developing coun-
tries to organize such publications, it would find itself poised to do so.  
Through the Peace Corps, the U.S. government has volunteers in ap-
proximately seventy-one countries.   Out of these countries, twenty-
two are among the fifty most biodiverse countries in the world.284  
The United States could mobilize Peace Corps volunteers to gather 
and publish information about traditional cures.  While this may re-
quire more funds on the part of the United States, such an effort 
should be viewed as an investment.  Because native populations have 
become increasingly wary and hesitant to share traditional medicinal 
knowledge with outsiders for fear of exploitation, using Peace Corps 
volunteers, who work in and are an active part of these communities, 
will break down this barrier. 
Overall, the benefits of instituting such a publication system are 
three-fold.  First, the fact that traditional cures have been documented 
will prevent companies from obtaining a patent based on the loophole 
under section 102(a) of U.S. patent law. 285  Indeed, the loophole cre-
ated in section 102(a) undercuts the public policy behind patent 
law.286  Second, because such a publication would encourage indige-
nous 
le traditional medicinal cures will be ava
                                                    
283 See Peace Corps, About the Peace Corps, Where Do Volunteers Go?, at 
http://www.peacecorps.org/index.cfm?shell=learn.wherepc (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) 
(Peace Corps informational website). 
284 See Fogarty International Center, Economic Development and Biodiversity, at 
http://www.fic.nih.gov/programs/countries.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
The World Conservation Monitoring Centre has designated Groups of countries that are 
likely to be conservation priorities based upon species richness and endemism. 
Group 1 countries are the 25 most biodiverse countries in the world in terms of sheer 
numbers of species present. These countries are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Cameroon, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Madagas-
car, Malaysia, México, Papua New Guinea, Perú, the Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, 
the USA, [ex-USSR], Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zaire. 
Group 2 countries are the 25 next most biodiverse countries in the world in terms of sheer 
number
Re
s of species. These countries are: Angola, Botswana, Cambodia, Central African 
teers). 
public, Chile, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Iran, 
Kenya, Laos, Myanmar, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda and Zambia. 
Id.  (emphasis added to denote countries where the United States has Peace Corps volun-
285 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
286 See discussion supra Part I.C. 




                          
 
will benefit the population worldwide.287  Finally, the written publica-
tion would give indigenous populations leverage in negotiating con-
tracts, which, at the very least, will include the non-waivable mini-
mum terms described above.  The opportunity to secure a continuous 
stream of compensation (i.e., royalty payments) will infuse third 
world countries with much needed funds to provide their inhabitants 
with improved infrastructure, healthcare, and educational opportuni-
ties. 
B.  The Cure for Modern-Day Biopiracy 
Farmers who maintain conventional farming practices should rec-
ognize that they have much to gain from consumers who are commit-
ted to buying non-GM food.  Not only do such consumers provide 
traditional farmers with revenue, but they also reduce the revenue of 
manufacturers of GM seed such as Monsanto.  For example, consum-
ers who boycott GM products give conventional farmers the eco-
nomic strength necessary to counter the lobbying efforts of seed bio-
technology firms and the resulting corporate-friendly laws.  
Specifically, conventional farmers should work to increase the per-
centage of people who boycott GM food products by giving consum-
ers the power to differentiate between GM and non-GM food prod-
ucts. 
Statistics indicate that conventional farmers already have an inter-
e.  For example, despite the fact that GM crop revenues 
continue to soar—rising from an estimated $75 million in 1995 to 
.6 billion in 1998, and increasing another 50 percent to reach nearly 
$2.3 billion in 1999—overall consumer and food industry confide
in GM foods is relatively low.288  An ABC News poll conducted in 
2003 revealed that one-third of Americans try to avoid buying foods 
that have been genetically modified or treated with antibiotics or 
hormones.289  In addition, almost half of adults indicated they would 
try to avoid hormone- or antibiotic-treated food labeled as such.290  
                              
Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 408–11 (2002). 
 News Poll: Food Safety 1 (July 13, 2003), at 
ht
287 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
288 See 
289 ABC
tp://abcnews.go.com/images/pdf/930a1FoodSafety.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
290 Id.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) “has opted to take the view 
that unless real consequences ensue from the fact that a food is produced 
employing biotechnology techniques, the mere fact that certain consum-
ers may want information regarding whether the food is produced by bio-
technology does not require such labeling.”  Frederick H. Degnan, Legal  
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 GM foods.   Fi-
na
                                                                                                                      
As expected, consumer demand continues to dictate the actions of the 
major players in the food processing industry.  For example, in 2002 
large food processors Frito-Lay, Seagram, Gerber, and Heinz pledged 
“not to use GM foods in their products.”291  Furthermore, Whole 
Foods Markets, Wild Oats Markets, and the Iceland Supermarket 
Group have announced their refusal to market any 292
lly, in 1999, in what may have been the most significant setback to 
GM seed manufacturers in the United States, Archer Daniels Mid-
land, one of the two major grain distribution companies, advised 
farmers “to segregate GM grain from non-GM grain.”293  As a result, 
the percentage of GM corn produced in the United States dropped 
from 33 percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2000.294
While there is already a system in place that allows consumers to 
tell the difference between organic foods and non-organic foods, 
which may be GM or non-GM, there is no official system that differ-
entiates between GM and non-GM foods.295  Thus, in order to avoid 
purchasing GM foods under the current system, consumers must opt 
for the products labeled as “certified organic.”  This may have a lim-
ited effect on the consumer boycott rate of GM foods because organic 
foods are more expensive.296  Rather than lobbying Congress to re-
quire labeling of GM foods,297 efforts should be directed toward es-
tablishing a system that labels conventional foods. 
 
Aspects of FDA’s Food Regulation of Food Biotechnology, SJ033 A.L.I. 
 system to differentiate between or-
ga  example, the PLU code for conventionally grown 
fru faced by the 




131, 138 (2003). 




295 The stickers that grocery stores place on fruits and vegetables and that contain price 
look-up (PLU) codes may be viewed as an unofficial
nic, conventional, and GM foods.  For
it consists of four numbers, organically grown fruit has five numbers pre
mber nine, and GM fruit has a PLU cod
mber eight.  Joseph Mercola & Rachael Droege, How Do You Know if your Food is Ge-
netically Modified?, at http://www.mercola.com/2004/jan/24/gm_foods.htm (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2005).  The problem with this system is that it is voluntary and does not allow 
consumers to differentiate when ssed foods.  See Kristen Philipkoski, 
Cracking the Frankenfood Code (Oct. 22, 2003), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,60911,00.html?tw=wn_story_related (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2005).  See Andrew J. Nicholas, Note, As the Organic Food Industry Gets 
its House in Order, The Time Has Come for National Standards for Genetically Modified 
Foods, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 283 (2003). 
296 Nicholas, supra note 295, at 279. 
297 The likelihood of this is slim.  See supra text accompanying not
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The organic food industr eginnings as a grass roots 
mo
 in the environment, effectively limiting modern-day biopiracy. 
CONCLUSION 
With regard to traditional biopiracy, fostering a mutually beneficial 
coexistence is a relatively straightforward solution.  Put simply, the 
United States must ensure that indigenous populations receive com-
pensation.  To fail in this respect would stunt innovation, and thereby 
undermine the policy that supports the U.S. patent system and fuels 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
The “cure” for modern-day biopiracy, on the other hand, will in-
volve farming alliances and consumer outcry.  Conventional farmers 
must organize to ensure the future of their farming practices; such a 
strategy will only be successful if they educate consumers about the 
risks of GM food. 
                                                       
y had modest b
vement in the 1960s.  Since its inception, it has become “an $11 
billion-a-year business,” with sales increasing by nearly 30 percent 
from 1998 to 2000.298  Unsurprisingly, consumers cite perceived 
health benefits as the most common reason for purchasing organic 
products.299  Similarly, by educating the public about the health risks 
associated with GM foods300 and establishing a national labeling sys-
tem, conventional farmers may begin to carve their own niche, further 
limiting the revenues that seed manufacturing conglomerates generate 
from consumers.  Reducing consumer demand for GM products will 
cause an increasing number of farmers to choose to grow organic or 
conventional crops.  In turn, GM seed revenues for companies like 
Monsanto will continue to shrink, which will decrease the funds that 
such companies may spend to research and develop new GM prod-
ucts.301  Overall, this will reduce the amount of GM seed contami-
nants
 
298 See Nicholas, supra note 295, at 278. 
299 For an interesting summary of the hazards associated with GM foods see Ronnie 
Cummins, Hazards of Genetically Engineered Foods and Crops: Why We Need A Global 
Moratorium (Aug. 24, 1999), at http://www.mercola.com/2000/dec/3/ge_food.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
300 “In 1989 a genetically engineered brand of L-tryptophan, a common dietary sup-
plement, killed 37 Americans and permanently disabled or afflicted more than 5,000 oth-
ers with a potentially fatal and painful blood disorder, eosinophilia myalgia syndrome 
(EMS), before it was recalled by the Food and Drug Administration.”  Id.  Just five years 
later, despite warnings of increased cancer rates, the Food and Drug Administration ap-
proved Monsanto’s much-contested GM recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone, which 
dairy cows are currently injected with to produce more milk.  See id. 
301 See generally Nicholson, supra note 13, at 12. 
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While the methods to eradicate traditional and modern-day biopi-
racy are different, the ultimate goal is the same: long-term sustainabil-
ity. 
